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INDIANA'S ALIMONY CONFUSION
In Indiana, alimony is an award determined in a judicial division
of property1 owned by the parties at the termination of the marriage.
Historically, however, alimony was awarded only to a separated wife in
order to satisfy her continuing need for support upon separation of the
spouses.2 Yet in recognition of that need, many jurisdictions now award
support alimony when granting absolute divorces as well as when granting
mere separations.! The result may be to allow the wife a double award;
1. See, e.g., Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 140 Ind. App. 657, 233 N.E.2d 667 (1967),
appeal dismissed, 249 Ind. 572, 233 N.E.2d 667 (1968) ; McDaniel v. McDaniel, 245 Ind.
551, 201 N.E.2d 215 (1964) ; Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956).
2. Prior to 1857, the ecclesiastical courts of England possessed exclusive jurisdiction
over all marital disputes, see, Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of West-
em Countries, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1953). Viewing marriage as a sacred and in-
dissoluble institution, the Church's authority was limited to declaring that a valid mar-
riage never existed (void ab initio) or to authorizing the parties to live separately while
remaining man and wife, divorce a inenso et thoro. Since the granting of a divorce
a mnenso et thoro did not terminate the marriage, the necessity to award alimony as sup-
port arose. The court considered such variables as the needs of the wife, Kempe v.
Kempe, 162 Eng. Rep. 668 (1828) and the ability of the husband to pay, Durant v. Dur-
ant, 162 Eng. Rep. 667 (1828). Then the courts established an amount which the hus-
band was to pay periodically, Wilson v. Wilson, 162 Eng. Rep. 1175 (1830) in order to
satisfy his legal liability for her support. Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Ali-
inony Law, 6 L & CONTEMP. PROD. 186, 188 (1941). The award was designated "perma-
nent alimony" and was in effect an obligation to support the separated wife.
When the ecclesiastical courts were abolished parliament granted to the English
courts the right to give absolute divorces (divorce a vinculo inatrimnone) which dissolved
the existing marriage. Thus the development of the absolute divorce required special
treatment to be given to permanent alimony, since it terminated the husband's common
law duty to support the wife and similarly ended the wife's right to demand alimony.
Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913).
3. "Alimony" literally means nourishment or sustenance, Smith v. Smith, 86 Ohio
App. 479, 92 N.E.2d 418 (1949), but since it is a creation of each state's statutory enact-
ments no single definition is sufficient. Some provisions for alimony have been made in
almost every state. See C. FoorE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW, 908 note 3 (1966), for a listing of some relevant statutes. Some courts
simply define alimony as support for the wife. "'Alimony' is an allowance for support
and maintenance subsequent to divorce." Wilson v. Supreme Ct., 31 Cal. 2d 458, 462, 189
P.2d 266, 269 (1948) ; "'Alimony' is a prospective provision by divorce decree for a wife's
future support, to be administered in the future, expressly variable from time to time as
seems just and reasonable to the court, and involving the state's public policy." Bogert v.
Watts, 32 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754-55, (1942) rev'd on other grounds, 38 N.Y.S.2d 426, 265
A.D. 931; "'Alimony' is but a judicial admeasurement of the husband's obligation to
maintain his former wife periodically out of his income." Madden v. Madden, 136 N.J.
Eq. 132, 136, 40 A.2d 611, 614 (1945) ; "'Alimony' ... is a continuous allotment of sums,
payable at regular intervals, for a wife's support from year to year." Birnstill v. Birnstill,
218 Ark. 130, 131, 234 SAV.2d 757, 758 (1950). While others award alimony for the
purpose of requiring the husband to make periodic payments to the wife commensurate
with his circumstances and her necessities. Burger v. Burger, 6 N.J. Super. 52, 54, 69
A.2d 741, 742 (1949).
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one for support and another for a division of the spouses' property.,
Indiana courts, however, rather, consistently have construed the current
alimony statute so as to preclude awards based on future support of the
divorced wife.
In equating alimony to a mere division of property, the divorced wife
in Indiana is often placed in a financially insecure position, where the
marital property is insufficient to satisfy her continuing needs. In ad-
dition, the failure of courts to adopt variable alimony awards, or to
consider support as an element in lump-sum awards has denied divorced
spouses in Indiana the full benefit of increased awards through the
deduction of such payments from the husband's gross income.' However,
several recent cases8 have indicated a possible willingness to consider
future support as an element in granting the award. The result has been
total confusion as to the actual nature of an alimony award in Indiana.
In order more clearly to evaluate Indiana's alimony confusion, a
summary explanation of the process utilized in determining an alimony
award is necessary. Although Indiana has no explicit rules for awarding
alimony,' it does have some general guidelines. Perhaps most frequently
mentioned is the "one-third rule of thumb" which allows the trial court,
when awarding alimony to an injured wife, to grant a sum which would
leave her as financially secure as if she had been a surviving wife upon
her husband's death.8 An Indiana court may also consider the existing
property rights of the parties,' the amount of property owned and held
by the husband, including the source from which it came,"0 the financial
4. "Division of property" is not the same concept as alimony. Fincham v. Fincham,
174 Kan. 199, 209, 225 A.2d 1018, 1025 (1953), to the extent that the court takes into
consideration all property accumulated by the spouses, and then determines the ownership
of the property, Paul v. Paul, 183 Kan. 201, 326 P.2d 283 (1958).
5. See, INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §§ 71(a) (1), (c) (2).
6. See, lt Re Webb, 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958) ; State ex rel. Roberts v.
Morgan Circuit Court, 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.E.2d 871 (1968) ; Baxter v. Baxter, 138 Ind.
App. 24, 195 N.E.2d 877 (1964) ; Bahre v. Bahre, 133 Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639
(1962).
7. Ringenberg v. Ringenberg, 110 Ind. App. 290, 38 N.E.2d 870 (1942) ; Radabaugh
v. Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 350, 35 N.E.2d 114 (1941) ; Glasscock v. Glasscock, 94 Ind.
163 (1883). The awarding of alimony is not controlled by definite rules. The deter-
mination of each case must depend upon its own circumstances.
8. Temme v. Temne, 103 Ind. App. 569, 9 N.E.2d 111 (1937) ; Glick v. Glick, 86
Ind. App. 593, 159 N.E. 33 (1927). A similar general rule is that the wife must be left
as well in non-cohabitation as in cohabitation. Adams v. Adams, 117 Ind. App. 335, 69
N.E.2d 632 (1947) ; Boggs v. Boggs, 45 Ind. App. 397, 90 N.F_. 1040 (1910) ; Yost v. Yost,
141 Ind. 584, 41 N.E. 11 (1895). An exception has developed in that the one-third rule
is no longer applicable to property held by the entireties or under agreement of survivor-
ship. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956).
9. Bahre v. Bahre, 133 Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639 (1962) ; Ferguson v. Fergu-
son, 125 Ind. App. 596, 125 N.F-2d 816 (1955).
10. Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 52 N.E.2d 506 (1944); Mclie v. McHie,
106 Ind. App. 152, 16 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
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condition and income of the parties and the ability of the husband to earn
money.' At the same time the court may evaluate the industry and
economy of the wife in contributing to the accumulation of her husband's
property,' 2 the separate estate of the wife,'" the misconduct of the
husband,'" and the misconduct of the wife.'"
In providing for alimony, the award of which is not mandatory,"
the courts have been vested with broad discretion," and judgments will
not be disturbed upon appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of
such discretion.'" When the court, in its discretion, determines that
alimony is proper, two considerations become necessary. First, the court
must weigh all available, and relevant financial conditions ;9 and second,
the court must consider the circumstances of the parties at the time the
divorce is granted, but not according to representations made before the
marriage."0
11. Bahre v. Bahre, 133 Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639 (1962) ; Cornwell v. Corn-
well, 108 Ind. App. 350, 29 N.E.2d 317 (1940) ; Glick v. Glick, 86 Ind. App. 593, 159
N.E. 33 (1927) ; Hendrick v. Hendrick, 128 Ind. 522, 26 N.E. 768 (1891).
12. Yost v. Yost, 141 Ind. 584, 41 N.E. 11 (1895).
13. Stultz v. Stultz, 107 Ind. 400, 8 N.E. 238 (1886).
14. The court should consider the nature of the abuse inflicted upon the wife, and
particularly, if the abuse affected the wife's earning capacity. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind.
210, 214, 132 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1956). See also Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 52
N.E.2d 506 (1944) ; Rariden v. Rariden, 33 Ind. App. 254, 70 N.E. 398 (1904) ; Ifert v.
Ifert, 29 Ind. 473 (1868).
15. While finding gross misconduct on the part of the wife may result in a denial of
alimony, it does not necessarily prevent the award of alimony, see, e.g., Proctor v. Proc-
tor, 125 Ind. App. 692, 125 N.E.2d 443 (1955), where the husband was granted a divorce,
custody of the children, and ownership of property held by the entireties, and no ali-
mony was given the wife. The appellate court affirmed finding no abuse of discretion
due to the wife's gross misconduct
16. While IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1217 (Burns Repl. 1968) reads "The court shall make
such decree for alimony . . .' it has been held that "the word 'shall' . . . merely re-
lates to the amount of alimony that may be allowed in cases where it is proper to allow
alimony." Glasscock v. Glasscock, 94 Ind. 163, 164-65 (1883). See also, Ralston v. Rals-
ton, 111 Ind. App. 570, 571, 41 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1942); Smith v. Smith, 131 Ind. App.
38, 46, 169 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1960).
17. Adams v. Adams, 117 Ind. App. 335, 69 N.E.2d 632 (1947) ; Cornwell v. Corn-
well, 108 Ind. App. 350, 29 N.E.2d 317 (1940) ; Dissette v. Dissette, 208 Ind. 567, 196
N.E. 684 (1935).
18. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 245 Ind. 551, 201 N.F_.2d 215 (1964) ; Shula v. Shula,
235 Ind. 210, 132 N.F2d 612 (1956); Ralston v. Ralston, 111 Ind. App. 570, 41 N.E.2d
817 (1942) ; Temme v. Temme, 103 Ind. App. 569, 9 N.E.2d 111 (1937) ; Glick v. Glick,
86 Ind. App. 593, 159 N.E. 33 (1927).
19. In McDaniel v. McDaniel, 245 Ind. 551, 561, 201 N.E.2d 215, 218 (1964), the
court granted a divorce to the wife but made no findings as to a "spendthrift trust" made
up of money used solely to compensate the husband for a personal injury. The court
held: the trust was property of the parties and the trial court had a duty to state findings
of fact, and conclusion of law regarding the trust in order to award alimony. Failure
to do so is reversible error.
20. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 125 Ind. App. 596, 125 N.E.2d 816 (1955). Where the
husband made representation of great wealth prior to the marriage, it is in no way rele-
vant to the question of the divorce or alimony. In Ferguson at the time of the divorce
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Although alimony is discretionary with the court, once the court has
acquired jurisdiction over the divorce, it must decide all property rights
whether the property was owned by one of the parties prior to marriage or
was acquired during the marriage.2 This obligation to adjust all property
rights is statutory2 2 and has been developed and extended by the courts.23
Included within the power of the court in making such adjustments,
is the authority to order the transfer of any property, real, personal or
mixed, between the parties.24 The courts have exercised broad powers of
discretion in the adjustment and division of such property, 5 and the
decision of the court in such matters will rarely be reversed.2"
While there is considerable recent authority holding that alimony is
awarded as a sum in settlement of the property interests existing upon
dissolution, and not for support, early Indiana divorce law provided for
open-ended alimony payments,2" with continuing jurisdiction, in the
court to alter and revise the original decree.29 The complexity of the
the husband did not have great wealth, and the alimony based partly upon this represen-
tation is reversible error. See also Ringenberg v. Ringenberg, 110 Ind. App. 290, 38
N.E.2d 870 (1942).
21. Draime v. Draime, 132 Ind. App. 99, 173 N.E.2d 70 (1961) ; Gray v. Miller, 122
Ind. App. 531, 106 N.E.2d 709 (1952) ; Wise v. Wise, 67 Ind. App. 647, 119 N.E. 501
(1917) ; Murry v. Murry, 153 Ind. 14, 53 N.E. 946 (1899).
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Burns Repl. 1968). This statute while primarily
focused upon the awarding of alimony, also recognizes the legislative intent to adopt a
policy to grant broad powers to the court to fully adjudicate the property rights' of the
parties. See, Wallace v. Wallace, 123 Ind. App. 454, 110 N.E.2d 514 (1953).
23. Grant v. Grant, - Ind. App. - , 230 N.E.2d 339 (1967) ; Nagel v. Nagel,
130 Ind. App. 465, 165 N.E.2d 628 (1960) ; Radabaugh v. Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 350,
35 N.E.2d 114 (1941).
24. Originally, it had been held that a court could not set off an interest in the
husband's real estate to a wife. Rice v. Rice, 6 Ind. 100, 105 (1854). Also in accord was
dicta in Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 560, 561, 40 N.E. 55, 56 (1894). However, the
Alexander case was expressly overruled in Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 116 Ind. App.
545, 555, 64 N.E.2d 806, 810 (1945), where the conveyance of property held as tenants
by the entireties to the injured party was proper-even after it had settled on her spouse.
The case of Gray v. Miller, 122 Ind. App. 531, 538, 106 N.E.2d 707, 712 (1952), also re-
iterates the court's power to order a transfer of property between the parties, whether it
be real, personal, or mixed. In accord with Gray v. Miller, see, Wallace v. Wallace, 123
Ind. App. 454, 110 N.E.2d 514 (1953).
25. In Draime v. Draime, 132 Ind. App. 99, 103-04, 173 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1961), the
court awarded the wife an absolute divorce, and title to all assets of the parties, except a
1955 Oldsmobile and $5500 which went to the husband. The court held that in adjusting
the property rights between the parties this award was not an abuse of the broad discre-
tionary powers of the trial court.
26. Seward v. Seward, 126 Ind. App. 607, 134 N.E.2d 560 (1956) ; McHie v. McHie,
106 Ind. App. 152, 16 N.E.2d 987 (1938) ; Tomchany v. Tomchany, 134 Ind. App. 27, 185
N.E. 301 (1922).
27. Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 140 Ind. App. 657, 233 N.E.2d 667 (1967); appeal
dismissed 249 Ind. 572, 233 N.E.2d 667 (1968) ; McDaniel v. McDaniel, 245 Ind. 551, 201
N.E.2d 612 (1964) ; Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956).
28. Ind. Acts, 1843, ch. 35, § 56.
29. Ind. Acts, 1843, ch. 35, § 63.
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1842-1843 statute led to a general revision in Indiana alimony statutes, 0
and the language of an 1852 revision has been carried forward in sub-
sequent statutory revisions."'
The bandwagon for Indiana's current position, of a lump sum, non-
support form of alimony, began rolling following the decision in Marsh v.
Marsh, where the court stated in dicta:
In providing that . . . the wife shall not receive annual
payments it was evidently the purpose of the legislature to pro-
hibit all indefinite allowances for support, and to require the
court to confine its allowances to her to a fixed sum on the
theory that henceforth they would be strangers."
It should be noted, however, that Marsh was decided on the question of
whether contempt would issue for failure to pay support, and that its
holding has since been modified by State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan
Circuit Court.8 It is also important to note that even during the period
when Marsh was the accepted guideline, some case law developed which
arguably supports a distinction between division of property and alimony
as support.84
The adoption in 1949 of section 3-1218 to the Indiana statutes added
a new dimension to awards of alimony in Indiana, in providing for
alimony to be paid:
... in gross or in periodic payments, either equal or unequal,
and that if paid in periodic payments the court would further
provide for their discontinuance or reduction upon the death or
remarriage of the wife."5
The question is whether the term "periodic payments" and the phrase
30. Ind. Acts, 1852, ch. 4, §§ 19, 22.
31. Ind. Acts, 1873, ch. 43, § 22. "The decree of alimony to the wife shall be for a
sum in gross and not for annual payments, but the court in its discretion may give a rea-
sonable time for the payments thereof, by installment, on a sufficient surety being given."
Ind. Acts, 1901, ch. 1059; Ind. Acts, 1914, ch. 1088; Ind. Acts, 1933, ch. 1111. This lat-
ter statute placed alimony under the currently used § 3-1218.
32. Marsh v. Marsh, 162 Ind. 210, 70 N.E. 154 (1904).
33. 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.F.2d 871 (1968). The Roberts court denied the husband's
petition for a writ of prohibition. Roberts based his case upon Marsh v. Marsh, 162 Ind.
210, 70 N.E. 154 (1904), which held that alimony is not enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings. The reasoning of this court, however, is that Acts 1949, ch. 120, § 2, p. 310,
§ 3-1218 and 3-1219(a) which allow for alimony as a sum in gross to be paid in periodic
payments which may be discontinued or reduced upon death or remarriage, modify the
holding of Marsh v. Marsh supra, so that.where there is a separation agreement which is
submitted to the court for enforcement, the court may exercise its equitable power of
civil contempt.
34. Radabaugh v. Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 350, 35 N.E.2d 114 (1941).
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Bums Repl. 1968).
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"discontinuance or reduction upon death or remarriage of the wife" were
inserted in order to allow the courts to make support payments to the
divorced spouse, or whether it was incorporated as a means to allow
Indiana alimony payments by the husband to be deductible under the
1942 Revenue Act,3" or both.
Prior to 1942 alimony paid by the husband was not deductible on
his federal income tax return, and the wife paid no federal income tax on
alimony which she received." With the gradual increase in tax rates,
this situation placed considerable hardships on an alimony paying
husband. Consequently the Federal Revenue Act of 1942 changed the
prior law to allow the husband to deduct alimony paid a former spouse
and to require the wife to pay income tax on the amount received." To
qualify for the deduction under the Revenue Code, the alimony paid must
either qualify as a "periodic payment," which has been interpreted as
meaning payments which are indefinite either as to time or amount,39
or else it must qualify under a special provision for installments payable
over ten years or more.40
Qualification under the 1942 Revenue Act is generally beneficial to
both the husband and wife. It allows the husband to deduct alimony
payments from his income, resulting in a lowered tax. In turn the husband
can afford to pay more alimony (where necessary) and since the wife is
typically in a lower tax bracket, her payment of the tax results in a net
increase in support payments.
The legislative purpose in adopting section 3-1218 conceivably
could have been to allow husbands to deduct alimony payments from
their income. However, the mere insertion of the term "periodic pay-
ments" in the Indiana statute would not be sufficient to qualify under the
tax law, which requires more than mere recitation of the term "periodic
payments." In order to qualify as a "periodic payment" under the Code the
award must be indefinite as to time or amount.4' The addition of the
phrase "discontinuance or reduction upon death or remarriage of the
wife" is an example of terminology used to signal a support award. Be-
cause the husband pays alimony according to the wife's necessity, her
36. REVENUE AcT of 1942, § 120, 56 Stat. 816, 817 (1942), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 71(a) (1).
37. Douglas v. Willicuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) ; Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
38. H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 482, § 14.12 (1968).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (i) (1957).
40. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71(c) (2). The statute expressly provides that a
fixed principal sum payable in installments will be considered to be periodic if it is pay-
able over a period of more than ten (10) years, but then only to the extent of ten per
cent of the principal sum.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (i) (1957).
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death or remarriage would cancel his statutory duty of support. Thus,
interpreted literally, the statute would allow alimony as support and at the
same time, since it would be variable, as to amount or duration, the
husband could receive his tax deduction.
Had courts followed a literal interpretation of the Indiana statute,
judicial power to determine the form and method for alimony payments
would have been expanded." Yet despite the statutory provision for
periodic payments, the courts continue to award alimony only as a sum in
gross.4"
One illustration of the above policy is Shula v. Shula where the
court held:
(1) Alimony in Indiana is awarded for the purpose of making
a present and complete settlement of the property rights of the
parties. (2) It does not include future support for the wife.44
Other more recent cases follow the Shula doctrine and overlook the 1949
statutory revision." These cases along with Shula serve to illustrate the
basic conflict between what the Indiana courts are awarding as alimony
and division of property. Recalling that the court in Indiana must adjust
all property rights (division of property) and that the court may grant
alimony, one asks whether granting alimony serves any valid purpose. It
is unclear, however, whether alimony in Indiana serves as a means of
support for the divorced spouse, or only as a division of property. If the
alimony award is already serving as support, it should be acknow-
ledged as such; if it is merely serving as another division of property, it
is unnecessarily repetitive.
Some recent cases have recognized a form of alimony which is not
solely a sum in gross. In particular there are four cases which recognize
42. Note, Alimony i Indiana: Traditional Concepts v. Benefits to Society, 29 IND.
L.J. 461, 470 (1953-54). Alimony awarded pursuant to an agreement including a "death
or remarriage" clause would clearly be a variable support award and therefore deductible
from the husband's income tax. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Bums Repl. 1968).
43. See note 27 sitpra.
44. 235 Ind. 210, 214, 132 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1956). More recently in Smith v.
Smith, 131 Ind. App. 38, 169 N.E.2d 130 (1960), under the Shula doctrine the Smith
case found it to be an abuse of judicial discretion to base a determination to allow or not
allow alimony on the economic situation of the appellant and her ability or inability to
support herself, since in Indiana alimony is not considered in the nature of support in the
future, for a wife.
45. Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 140 Ind. App. 657, 662, 233 N.E.2d 667, 671 (1967)
affirms Shula and McDaniel as to alimony in Indiana being made as a present and com-
plete settlement of the property rights of the parties. More particularly in McDaniel v.
McDaniel, 245 Ind. 551, 559, 201 N.E.2d 215, 219 (1964), the court states that ". . . in-
sofar as it is possible, there [is to] be a full and complete separation of the parties at the
time of the divorce and to this end . . . a fixed sum of alimony be determined, based on
the recent and immediately foreseeable circumstances of the parties .. "
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that under certain circumstances alimony as support may be awarded:
In re Webb,4" Bahre v. Bahre4 Baxter v. Baxter,4" and State ex rel.
Roberts v. Morgan Circuit Court."9
In re Webb"° is the earliest case which indicates an awareness that
alimony may be other than a sum in gross. In that case a federal district
court strained to approve a separation agreement providing for variable
alimony instead of merging it into the decree. By approving the agree-
ment the court tacitly acknowledged an award which it felt would be
beyond its power if merged.
In Bahre v. Bahre5" the court granted a divorce to the wife and
awarded 24,400 dollars to be paid over ten years and two months. The
wife appealed the judgment claiming that the award was insufficient.
The court reversed the award of alimony since the "one-third rule of
thumb" had been violated. Upon retrial the court relitigated the division of
property as well as alimony. When the second trial was appealed, the
court reversed the relitigation of the division of property for being be-
yond the intent of the court order but affirmed the new alimony award. 2
The significance of Bahre lies in its recognition that the division of pro-
perty and the award of alimony constitute distinct issues.
Baxter v. Baxter" approved a 680.25 dollar monthly payment, to
be incorporated into the divorce decree from a valid separation agree-
ment, until the sum of 204,075 dollars was paid. In the absence of death
or remarriage after payment of the total award, the payments of 680.25
dollars per month were to continue until her death or remarriage. Further,
the court held that the alimony judgment was a lien upon the husband's
real estate to the extent of the future monthly alimony payments. It is
apparent that Baxter contains two elements characteristic of a support
award: first, an alimony award which is clearly not a sum in gross, a
prerequisite of pre-1949 awards, as shown by the contingency of the
alimony lasting until death or remarriage. Second, the court allows the
alimony decree to serve as a judgment lien upon the husband's real
estate."
46. 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
47. 133 Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639 (1962).
48. 138 Ind. App. 24, 195 N.E.2d 897 (1964).
49. 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.E.2d 871 (1968).
50. 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
51. 133 Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639 (1962).
52. Bahre v. Bahre, 140 Ind. App. 246, 211 N.E.2d 627 (1965).
53. See note 47 supra.
54. In holding that the judgment for alimony is a present lien on real estate now
owned by the husband or a lien for future payments on property subsequently acquired,
the court used its power to enforce a variable alimony award.
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In the most recent case, State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan Circuit
Court,5 another wedge was inserted into the opening in Indiana's non-
support complete settlement doctrine. In Roberts the court merged a
separation agreement providing for six thousand dollars in alimony pay-
ments. The wife petitioned for contempt for failure to pay the alimony,
and the husband, relying upon Marsh v. Marsh,6 sought a writ of
prohibition. The court denied the writ, thereby modifying Marsh v.
Marsh," which had held that alimony is not enforceable by contempt
proceedings. The significance of Roberts is that an action for contempt,
available only to enforce support judgments, is no longer necessarily
improper in Indiana. Also by merging the separation agreement, unlike
the approval in Webb, the court indicated that it had the authority to
allow variable alimony.5 8
Before suggesting how Indiana's alimony problems could be re-
solved, a glance at the nature of alimony awards in other states may be
helpful. Today the form of alimony awards in the United States is
generally a matter for the determination of the trial court, and customarily
the alimony award is made in such a manner that it remains under the
control of the court. 9 Where authorized by statute alimony may take the
form of a sum in gross,6" but in some jurisdictions a sum in gross award
is not considered alimony because it is in the nature of a final property
settlement, not money payments at regular intervals."' Most commonly
alimony is awarded as periodic payments,62 and in some states alimony
must be paid periodically." Because of the importance of allowing the
court continued jurisdiction, it has been held that periodic payments are
preferable to alimony in gross.6 4
55. See note 33 supra.
56. 162 Ind. 210, 70 N.E. 154 (1904).
57. Id.
58. Here the court used the contempt power to enforce an agreement providing for
variable alimony, which had been merged into the courts decree. Contempt would not
have issued unless the agreement had been merged.
59. Cruikshank v. Cruikshank, 25 Cal. App. 2d 144, 121 P.2d 25 (1942); Lewis v.
Lewis, 109 Mont. 42, 94 P.2d 211 (1939) ; Greenberg v. Greenberg, 99 N.J. Eq. 461, 133
A. 768 (1926) ; Meighen v. Meighen, 307 Ill. 306, 138 N.E. 613 (1923).
60. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-21 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (1969);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 552-23
(Supp. 1970) ; OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107, 100 (1969).
61. Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. 545, 547, 5 A.2d 789, 791 (1939).
62. Heckes v. Heckes, 129 Fla. 653, 176 So. 541 (1937) ; McIlroy v. McIlroy, 191
Ark. 45, 83 S.W.2d 550 (1935) ; Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
63. Birnstill v. Birnstill, 218 Ark. 130, 234 S.W.2d 757 (1950).
64. Druck v. Druck, 258 Minn. 114, 116, 103 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1960). Alimony in
gross is in the nature of a final property settlement, and in some jurisdictions 'is not in-
cluded in the term "alimony" which in a strict or technical sense contemplates money
payments at regular intervals. See also, Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554, 556 (Pa.
1949).
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Where there is little or no property to be divided, Indiana's current
practice of awarding alimony as a present and complete settlement of
property rights, if the doctrine were adhered to, is unjust. Recognizing
possible injustice, courts have attempted to avoid it by characterizing the
husband's income earning capacity as a valuable "property" capable of
division. Yet even where future earning ability has been considered an
asset of the marriage, there is difficulty when the need for support in-
creases or the ability to earn decreases. Where the award is a liquidated
sum in gross there is no flexibility for the court to modify the award to
meet real changes in circumstances.
For Indiana to overcome the inherent conflict in its "alimony"
awards it must first recognize the difference between the distinctive
rationales of property division and alimony. Second, since the court must
divide the property in all cases, particularly where there is sufficient
property to satisfy the needs of the wife, property division should remain
the basic tool of the court. Hopefully the court in dividing this property
would make an award which is just and proper, and would not refer back
to the source from whence it came. 5 In those cases, however, in which
the assets are insufficient to support the spouse after a division of
property, the court should award alimony as support. This award should
be for a periodic payment, under the continuing jurisdiction of the court,
capable of alteration where necessary.
Although it may be gratifying to provide for finality in divorce
with a present and complete settlement, in most cases it simply is not
practical to do so. Instead a balance must be struck between the desire for
finality of divorce and the necessity of support to an ex-wife. Further,
since the end result of a spouse who cannot provide for herself requires
either the ex-husband or the state to provide her support, policy con-
siderations demand that the husband continue this support to the extent
of his current ability.
Section 3-1218 has given the court the means to award alimony as
a periodic, modifiable, support order. The task is to begin immediately
the use of this statute as an alimony award for support where it is needed.
The court could adopt a "net need"6 approach to the awarding of
alimony. This entails the balancing of the wife's financial requirements
against the husband's ability to pay from future income, taking into
consideration the wife's earning capacity.
65. See, Hopson, Divorce and Aliniony Under the New Code, 12 KAN. L. REv. 27
(1963), in which all property would be placed into a "common pot" with the source not
being relevant, and then divide the property as is just and proper.
66. See, Hofstacher & Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 JouR. OF FAB1lLY
LAW 51, 56 (1967).
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The elements of support are already present in Indiana cases.
Consideration of such factors as income of parties, their total financial
condition, and the earning ability of the husband, automatically result in
maldng support judgments. Considering the breadth of section 3-1218,
which allows either periodic payments or a sum in gross, and the recent
decisions in Webb, Bahre, Baxter, and Roberts, the time is ripe for the
courts to utilize fully their statutory authority to grant periodic payments
which may be variable and in which support may be considered as an
element. Because the courts already consider the proper elements in those
cases where division of property is insufficient to meet the basic needs of
the ex-spouse, the courts merely need to award alimony as support using
periodic payments and to retain continuing jurisdiction.
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